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Abstract 
 
The late 1980s-mid-1990s reconstruction of the history of Soviet repressions critically 
influenced the social formation of Gulag memory in Russia. Amongst those re-narrating the 
past, 'Memorial' Society and the Russian Orthodox Church most actively shaped the 
collective memory of Soviet repressions, trying to establish multi-layered explanatory 
constructs of the Gulag. Their interpretations were crystallized through contemporary 
memorialisation acts in significant landscapes of the past. Focusing on Solovki, 
Ekaterinburg, Butovo and Magadan and analysing tensions in their memorialisation 
processes, we discuss secular and Orthodox interpretations of the Gulag, and their impact 
on the memory of the Soviet repressions in contemporary Russia.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper we argue that to understand the contemporary form of Gulag memory in the 
Russian Federation it is necessary to focus on the late perestroika and early post-Soviet 
period of the late 1980s-mid 1990s, as a critical moment of social and cultural change 
when the 'nation's lens' on its past altered radically, and collective, post-Soviet memory of 
Stalinist repressions started to take form (Hochschild 2010, p.87). Nevertheless, the Gulag 
past had been discussed in some social circles earlier, during Khrushchev’s Thaw, when 
the process of prisoner rehabilitation started (Sherbakova, 1998; Adler 2004; Smith 1996; 
Adler 1993). The following thirty years, ‘were marked by inconsistent moves that revealed 
2 
as much as they obscured’ (Etkind 2009, p.634). Thus, it was only the end of the 1980s 
that ‘new revelations documented the processes, institutes, and personalities of terror 
with unprecedented detail’ (Etkind 2009, p.645). In the absence of a coherent notion of 
post-Soviet identity, many interest groups sought to narrate the past in their own way 
(Forest and Johnson 2002, p.528) and to imbue it with new significance and meaning. As 
we will show in this article, the specificity of the collective memory of Soviet repressions 
is that it crystallised through a process of memorialisation of significant Gulag sites. We 
focus, however, only on memory projects led by the 'Memorial' Society and the Russian 
Orthodox Church because, as we will show, these organizations assumed a leading role in 
shaping the collective memory of Soviet repressions through the ways in which they 
marked Gulag sites for commemoration. Initially, during the anti-Communist protests of 
the late Soviet period, they had jointly proclaimed their slogans: democratic messages 
mostly voiced by 'Memorial', and nationalistic messages expressed by the Russian Orthodox 
Church (Barner-Barry 1999, p.101). However, when they began independently to form 
their own interpretations of the past and to erect their monuments in significant sites of 
Soviet repression, their paths increasingly began to diverge. Although the framing of their 
interpretations of the past was fixed by the mid-1990s, over time one dominant visual 
narrative has emerged, and today, we argue, one visual language of memorialisation has 
taken precedence, with implications not only for how the Gulag period is remembered in 
Russia, but also for the contested contemporary interpretations of the Soviet and 
particularly the Stalin eras (Shlapentokh and Bondartsova 2009; Oushakine 2007; 
Nikolayenko 2008). These commemorations take place in the absence of any 'official' state 
public commemoration policy for the repressions. As Anstett (2011) notes, there has been 
a lack of direct sustainable government intervention, either federal, regional1 or local, in 
the field of national heritage, aimed at preserving the emblematic sites of the Gulag, and 
Russia still lacks a national museum to the Gulag. 
The paper unfolds as follows. First, we discuss the notion of collective memory, and the 
connection between landscape and memory. Next, we give some background to the two 
memory actors, 'Memorial' and the Russian Orthodox Church, before briefly discussing the 
methodology used to generate the data presented in the paper, and focusing on the four 
sites of memory themselves. The lieux de mémoire selected for study here are; the 
Solovetski Islands - widely considered to be the first Soviet prison camp; Ekaterinburg - 
                                                 
1 An exception is the Pokayanie Foundation in Syktyvkar, sponsored by the government of the Komi Republic. 
One of its projects is described later in this article. For more about memory projects founded by the Pokayanie 
Foundation, see Bogumił 2012b. 
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the place of the murder of the Russian royal family, considered by many to herald the 
later events of the Soviet 20th century; Magadan, the capital of the most notorious Gulag 
camp region of Kolyma; and Butovo, a place of mass executions located near to Moscow 
and called the 'Russian Golgotha' 2  by the Russian Orthodox Church. By the end of 
perestroika each of these sites had become an arena of intense commemorative activity by 
both the Russian Orthodox Church and 'Memorial'. Their actions at each site in the mid-
late 1990s clearly show that both actors tried to deploy these sites as vehicles for their 
own interpretations of history, in order to support the creation of collective memory in a 
particular way.  
Cultural Landscape and Collective Memory  
Virtually every consideration of the concept of collective memory begins with reference to 
the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs - as Misztal puts it 'his assertion that every group 
develops a memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity is still the starting 
point for all research in the field' (Misztal 2003, p.51). Halbwachs' key concepts, that 
collective memory is constitutive of group identity; that memories are acquired and 
evoked socially, not individually; and that collective memories are rooted in the present, 
and continually recalled and remade according to the needs of the present (Halbwachs 
1952), are central to our understanding of collective memory. However, for our study 
Halbwachs' most important work is his 1941 La topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre 
sainte, in which, he described the dynamic relationship between collective memory and 
place. He explored how spaces in Jerusalem had been overlain with layers of memory by 
Jews, Romans, Christians and Muslims, all of whom have used the landscape, buildings, 
paths and other elements of the cultural landscape as parts of their frameworks of 
remembering (Halbwachs 1941), and argued that Jerusalem began to be transformed by 
Christians in accordance with their religious ideas long after the events critical to 
Christianity took place there. Therefore, sacred sites commemorate not just the facts 
which may be historically verifiable, but the beliefs which are connected with these 
places. In Jerusalem the majority of these are related to the ‘supernatural’ acts of Christ, 
around which Christian beliefs were formed. Halbwachs shows that the holy places of 
Christianity derive from Jewish memories, whose material markers, however, were 
                                                 
2 According to Christian belief, Golgotha, also known as Calvary, in Jerusalem, is the site where the crucifixion 
of Jesus took place. Although the exact site is still disputed, the area is a destination for thousands of pilgrims 
each year. The development of Christian ‘messianism’ led to the term Golgotha becoming a rhetorical figure 
willingly used by different national groups (Russians, but also Poles or Serbians) to describe the exceptionality 
of their fate and suffering in different historical moments. 
4 
removed from these spaces (Halbwachs 1941, p.184). In other words, the meaning these 
places hold is a product of the adaptation of the heritage of the past, with current beliefs 
based on the material traces of ancient beliefs 3. Moreover, the actions of groups of 
believers who are involved in the process of commemoration have a key influence on the 
perception of these places (Halbwachs 1941,p.205). Thus, places in the cultural landscape 
are especially attractive components of a framework of collective memory by virtue of 
their perceived stability. What better way to underpin a community's claim to a specific, 
unbroken lineage than by linking it to the “material milieu that surrounds us"? (Connerton 
1989, p.37).  
In this paper, we are concerned with the ways in which ‘Memorial’ and the Orthodox 
Church inscribed their interpretations into Gulag sites in order to legitimise their position 
and role in society.  Our research traces its theoretical roots to Hobsbawm and Ranger's 
(1983) study of the construction of tradition (and by extension social memory). This 
influential work sought to demonstrate that much of what is currently presented as age-
old 'tradition' is, in fact, a relatively recent invention, created to increase social cohesion 
and cement group membership, to legitimise the authority of governing institutions, and 
to ensure group members share the same belief systems and norms of behaviour 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Hobsbawm and Ranger point to the processes and materials 
used to construct new traditions, and they highlight the fact that a tradition itself may 
become the site and symbol of discord, a battleground where group identity is negotiated 
and tested (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This observation has been developed and tested 
by numerous scholars of memorialisation (see Johnson 1995, 2002; Gillis 1994; Forest and 
Johnson 2002) and is also particularly pertinent for our study of collective memory in the 
Gulag cultural landscape. Mitchell has likened such  investigations to an ‘archaeology of 
power’, that uses the diverse traces inscribed in the cultural landscape - but especially 
around commemorative sites such as memorials and statues - to piece together a picture 
of the way a dominant force in a given society wanted people to remember, and to forget 
(Mitchell 2003, p.446). However, sites have different social importance, so to understand 
conflict in memorialisation, it is important to look at the site itself, and not just at its 
social actors. As Friedland and Hecht (2006, p.19) argue ‘in the geographer’s gaze, 
historical events may have taken place in multiple locations, but in the cultures of sacred 
                                                 
3 Stefan Czarnowski, another scholar inspired by Durkheimian thought, comes to very similar conclusions while 
analysing the meaning of Hercules monuments. Czarnowski shows how the cult of Hercules and its 
representations emerge from a basis of earlier beliefs and representations of different gods. (Czarnowski, 
1956a, pp. 139-160). Compare also what Czarnowski writes about cult of Saint Patrick in Ireland (Czarnowski 
1956/1919b)  
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place, those same historical moments all happened in that place. The ancestors whose 
lives and actions constituted human society are all buried there’. Since identities are 
realized in space and in place, these sites have to be ‘able to control the periphery, to 
neutralize the periphery and other claimants of the center’; they must be ‘sacred' places 
(Friedland and Hecht 2006, p.19), in which not just any event took place, but an event 
which ‘in the mind of the rememberer  - should have been different’ (Landres and Stier 
2006, p.4). As we will show in this paper, the material form of a monument, even if it is a 
natural stone, cannot be treated as neutral because it ‘entails an opportunity cost insofar 
as the imagination of a particular alternative past necessarily implies the exclusion (or 
forgetting) of other imagined pasts’ (Landres and Stier 2006, p.4).  
In this paper, therefore, we take a lead from Forest and Johnson (2002) in focusing on 
particular elements of the cultural landscape that have been constructed with the explicit 
aim of promoting a particular type of collective memory of Soviet repressions, unpacking 
both the visual imagery and symbolism used in these commemorative spaces, and its 
placement in and relationship with other elements of the environment (Till 2008; 
Crampton 2001; Johnson 2002). Recalling Renan's prescient statement that ‘l'essence d'une 
nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient 
oublies bien de choses’ (the essence of a nation is not only that individuals have many things 
in common, but also that they have all forgotten many things) (Renan in Bhabha 1990, 
p.11), we seek to investigate the processes whereby certain memories are commemorated 
in certain ways, and not others. The successful development of lieux de mémoire, sites of 
memory, can be ascribed to the social power and cultural capital of the person or group 
pushing for commemoration (Jordan 2006), with controversy and contestation around this 
process arising when power relations are in flux (Forest and Johnson, 2002). We do not 
argue here that an entirely 'invented'  collective memory or tradition can be imposed on 
people from above; as Misztal points out "people tend to reject any vision of the past 
which contradicts their recollection and sense of truth" (Misztal 2003, p.60). Viewing 
collective memory solely as the prerogative of ruling elites, who impose it onto the 
'passive' masses from on high, is seen by many theorists as a reductive, and unrealistic, 
approach which negates the power of the everyday experience (Irwin-Zarecka 2007; 
Misztal 2003; Olick 2003; Rolston 2010). We also acknowledge that the four sites of 
memory chosen for investigation in the paper by no means represent a comprehensive 
study of Gulag memorialisation. By restricting our analysis to such monuments and 
memorialisations - those Schudson would see as 'self-consciously framed acts of 
commemoration’ (Schudson 1997, p.3) we do not seek in any way to devalue the countless 
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other, private and personal places in which quotidian expressions of collective memory of 
the Gulag crystallise in space. We do, however, seek to critically engage with the 
activities of the 'Memorial' Society and the Russian Orthodox Church, in the late 1980s and 
mid-late 1990s, in order to shed light on the nature of Gulag memorialisation in 
contemporary Russia, and to trace the ways in which these two 'memory actors' sought to 
create lieux de mémoire to further their own interpretations of Gulag history.  
The data presented in the paper reflect two processes of parallel data generation, 
intended to access the discourses surrounding the development of four specific memory 
sites in the Russian Federation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These debates have been 
traced through local newspaper reporting in the various sites, and through consultation of 
documents held in the local archives of the 'Memorial' Society. Repeated visits to the sites 
themselves, and observation of both the memorials erected at these sites, including 
temporary exhibitions and visitors' 'interpretation panels', and the memory practices 
associated with them, have been supplemented with semi-structured interviews with local 
stakeholders. Fieldwork took place in the late 2000s, with newspaper sources pertaining to 
the early 1990s, and more recent interview material enabling reflection on the 
developments in the intervening decade. 
Memory Actors - the 'Memorial' Society and the Russian Orthodox Church  
As White (1995) noted, the 'Memorial' Society was one of the most important organisations 
of the perestroika period, presenting a significant challenge to the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) through a focus on history and symbolism. As Wieniamin Iofe, one of 
‘Memorial’’s leaders claimed ‘”Memorial” was created specifically for the work in this 
area - as an organization whose mission is to deliver Russia from the world of the Gulag, in 
which it resides to this day, whose language it speaks, by whose standards it lives, and 
whose values it adopts’ (Iofe 2002, p.113). Founded in 1989, according to its charter, 
'Memorial' aims to promote mature civil society and democracy based on the rule of law 
and thus to prevent a return to totalitarianism; to assist formation of public consciousness 
based on the values of democracy and law, to firmly establish human rights in practical 
politics and in public life, and to promote the revelation of the 'truth' about the historical 
past and perpetuate the memory of the victims of political repression exercised by 
totalitarian regimes (Adler 1993, 2004; Smith 1996). Active in political work, some 
'Memorial’ members held positions of authority at local and republic level, and by the end 
of the Soviet period the Society enjoyed great social confidence and support. As one 
interviewee said ‘in 1989 nearly everybody was a 'Memorial' member’.  
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The main aim of the counter-history offered by 'Memorial' in the Soviet era was to contest 
the dominant discourse of the USSR. For a long time 'Memorial' produced a discourse of 
opposition, which became an instrument of criticism of, and struggle with, Soviet power, 
with 'Memorial' campaigning for transparency of information about the victims of 
repression. 'Memorial' wanted to create a new language that would describe the essence 
of the Gulag experience and use it as a tool for societal transformation. Hence from the 
very beginning 'Memorial' paid close attention to dates and symbols. ‘They were supposed 
to constitute a secular collection of holidays and symbols of the new civic society built on 
the worked-through Gulag history’ (Bogumił 2012a, p 77). 
By the end of the 1990s, 'Memorial' had lost the political and social significance it had 
enjoyed at the time of perestroika, and today its activity may be defined as 'dissidence'.  
Its aims are still to ensure that victims of Soviet repressions are commemorated, but also, 
as its charter makes clear, to support democracy and human rights and to assist in the 
formation of public consciousness around these matters. It is arguably this ongoing 
contestation which has recently brought 'Memorial' into tension with the contemporary 
Russian state, and has led to a widely held perception of 'Memorial' as an anti-Putin 
movement.  
By contrast, from a weak position of mere toleration by the Soviet atheist regime, in the 
1990s the Russian Orthodox Church assumed a position of considerable power, arguably 
reclaiming Orthodoxy's pre-revolutionary position of primacy amongst religious faiths, and 
proximacy to state power. Numerous scholars have traced the resurgence in religious 
observance in Russia post-1991, and describe the reinvigoration of the Russian Orthodox 
Church as a significant factor in the formation of Russian national identity in the post-
Soviet period, as the Church arguably became a 'safe haven' in the context of turbulent 
social, economic and political circumstances (Greeley 1994; Davis 1996; Krindatch 2004). 
As Knox (2005, p.1) has argued, however, 'the great paradox of Russia's post-Soviet 
religious renaissance was the transition of the Moscow Patriarchate from a suppressed 
institution... to an institution which directs considerable effort to suppressing other 
religious bodies by discouraging religious pluralism and enjoying state-sanctioned 
privileges in a secular country'. The 1997 Law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations', rather than encouraging religious tolerance and pluralism, served to cement 
the Russian Orthodox Church's centrality to post-Soviet political, social and cultural 
development, through its various official and unofficial interventions in 'civil society'.  
It is fascinating that one means which connected the Church’s past and present and 
helped in ‘reshaping... the relationships between church and state and, most significantly, 
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between church and society’ was the canonisation process of the new Russian martyrs 
(Orlov and Kotzer 1998, p.159). In contrast to 'Memorial', the Russian Orthodox Church has 
offered a mythico-religious interpretation of Gulag history, with reference to biblical 
prophecy. It interprets the period of Soviet repression as a time of persecution of the 
faith, and views those who managed to maintain their faith, dying a martyr's death, as the 
foundation upon which the modern Russian Orthodox Church was reborn (Bogumił 2012a, 
p.82). This idea was very bluntly expressed by Igumen Damanskin (Damaskin (Orlovsky) 
2011, p.128), member of the Synod Commission on Canonisation of New Russian Saints, 
who claimed that at the beginning of the 20th century ‘Christians stopped perceiving their 
lives as a walk to God; they were starting to live only with people, being interested in how 
they are perceived by people – relatives, friends and leaders. (..) That is why God brought 
‘teplokhladnii’ [lukewarm] Christians back to Him through martyrdom’.   
A pervasive discourse of 'New Russian Martyrdom' (Bogumił 2011; Kahla 2010; Orlov and 
Kotzer 1998), espoused by the Russian Orthodox Church, ostensibly refers to victims of the 
political repressions who were persecuted for their faith, but as we will show, has 
increasingly been invoked to describe repression victims more generally, whose religious 
beliefs are unknown. Essentially, whilst 'Memorial' campaigns for transparency of records 
about victims of repression, and for full disclosure of information as a means of 
engendering a heightened public consciousness of the grisly reality of Russia's past, by 
deploying the 'New Russian Martyr' narrative, the Russian Orthodox Church arguably seeks 
to interpret the repressions as a mass martyrdom upon which the resurgent Church is 
founded (Bogumił 2012b). As Garrard and Garrard (2008, p.194-196) argue, the new 
martyrs not only allowed the resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church but also enabled 
its union with the Russian Orthodox Churches Outside Russia (ROCOR) and with the Russian 
Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA), because they shared many of the same ‘new martyrs’ 
and their canonisation became a pretext for dialogue.  
In the light of the lack of government willingness to commemorate the victims of political 
repressions, which in turn creates a vacuum of coherent secular commemorative language, 
the Russian Orthodox Church has grown in stature as an actor shaping collective memory. 
Whilst 'Memorial' has taken twenty years to draw up an initial list of more than 2.5 million 
victims (Račinskij and Roginski 2007)4, between the Millennium of Baptism of Russia (1988) 
                                                 
4 Arseny Roginski stresses that the difficulty of finding the places of executions in 1937 resulted in the absence 
of documents and the fragmentation of information (there is personal data for the murdered individual, and a 
date of execution, but the existing documents do not reveal the location of the actual shooting). Moreover, 
not all materials are available from the archives. As Roginski emphasizes ‘Memorial’ knows only 20-25% of the 
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up to 2009, the Russian Orthodox Church has canonised 1770 new martyrs, confessors and 
other sainted persons (Kahla 2010, p.196) creating sites of their cult (both topographic 
sites such as Butovo, Ekaterinburg, Katyn, and also icons or celebration dates).  As the 
burial sites for more than one million individual victims are still unknown, their families 
experience what is called the missing grave syndrome or homeless dead; they desperately 
need a place to mourn for the dead. Thus, the Orthodox Church creates symbolic, ‘sacred’ 
sites where people may come to mourn 5 , but also as Dorman (2010) argues it has 
'appropriated’ some sites of repression, by building permanent signs of religious devotion 
(crosses, shrines and chapels). These spaces become ritualised areas for the production of 
collective memory (Rousselet 2007) for families lacking a known burial place for their 
relations, where mourning rituals may be performed (Bogumił 2012b, p.115-116). 
This critical difference in the perception of the past means that both 'Memorial' and the 
Russian Orthodox church as memory actors had very different agendas for the shaping of 
collective memory, in terms of the aspects of history that they wanted to see 
commemorated, and precisely how they wanted to see that memorialisation take shape 
and influence collective memory. Therefore they have had very different ideas for the 
shaping of meaning of lieux de mémoire, attempting to impose upon these sites their own 
meanings and significations. In certain cases, 'Memorial' and the Russian Orthodox Church 
have come directly into conflict over the nature of memorialisation at specific lieux de 
mémoire, and it is these processes that we trace in the following sections of the paper.  
Solovetski Islands - between lieux de mémoire of zeks and martyrs 
The Solovetski Islands are undoubtedly amongst the most significant sites of Gulag history 
in Russia, a status they owe to Alexander Solzhenitsyn who claimed that the Islands were 
the “mother of the Gulag” system. Although later research has shown that labour camps 
were being established by the Bolsheviks from the beginning of the Revolution (Applebaum 
2003, p.27), the popular assumption that 'on Solovki, Gulag history began' has taken root, 
and with good reason. Created in 1923, the Solovetskii Lager' Osobogo Naznacheniya [SLON 
Solovetski Special Purpose Camp] became a testing ground for camp development. SLON 
history is also very well known, thanks to the survival of documents from which it may be 
reconstructed. This history is very dynamic and has its own internal drama (Applebaum 
                                                                                                                                                       
places of mass shootings in the years 1937-1938. However, the places of execution in the early 1920s, or the 
civil war, are shrouded in even greater mystery, and to determine their location is effectively impossible. 
(Roginsky’s lecture; conference during the Memory Days in Sandarmokh, 4th August 2007). 
5 One such site is the Solovetski cross in front of the Solovetski Monastery in Moscow, discussed later. 
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2003; Robson 2004), acted out by well-known figures, such as Paul Florensky, or Maksim 
Gorky, who enrich the narrative. Moreover, the Gulag period was only one of the tragic 
stages in the rich history of this archipelago, and therefore the Solovki Special Purpose 
Camp can also be read in a broader historical context. Finally, the location of the islands 
on the White Sea in the northernmost point of Russia, their magnificent natural 
environment and cultural remnants, as well as the fact that over the centuries their 
history has intertwined with the country’s history, ensure that Solovki has taken on an 
aura of enchantment, and is widely used by historians as the “miniature stage” not only of 
Gulag history, but also of Russian history (Robson 2004). 
The existence of this popular assumption that 'on Solovki, Gulag history began’ allows us 
better to understand the Gulag memorialisation process. It influenced the memory actions 
of both the 'Memorial' Society members and representatives of the Orthodox Church, for 
whom the Solovetski Islands have become an important element of memory infrastructure. 
In consequence the most significant memory projects located in the European part of the 
Russian Federation are semantically linked with Solovki. Just as the Solovetski Special 
Purpose Camp system itself spread throughout the Soviet Union to form the Gulag, many 
monuments and commemorative signs in this part of the Russian Federation are either 
associated with the Solovetski Islands, or physically originated there, as in the case of the 
Solovetski stones used by 'Memorial' Society, and the Solovetski crosses used by the 
Russian Orthodox Church, to mark out memory sites which these actors perceive as 
significant.  
Creation of the Solovetski Islands' cultural landscape of memory; its lieux de mémoire, was 
already underway by the perestroika period. Local and national newspapers printed 
information about the history of SLON (Bogumił 2010a). The first 'Memory Days' organized 
by the Solovetski Museum and members of the Moscow and Leningrad 'Memorial' Societies, 
which took place in June 1989, attracted former prisoners, their families, members of the 
'Memorial' Society and other people interested in the repressive past of their country 
(Bogumił 2012b). The most important event was the unveiling of the 'Monument to the 
Solovetski Prisoners'6 and a collective mourning. The monument took the form of a boulder 
from Solovki and it was placed at the location where prisoners accused in the so-called 
'Kremlin conspiracy' were shot in 19297 (Figure 1). The 'Solovetski Stone' was intended to 
                                                 
6 Czuchin. Na ostrove skorbi.  Newspaper article in the Archives of the Solovki Museum. 'General Information' 
folder. 
7 The case number 747-1 concerned a prisoner rising and mass escape to Finland. In consequence 36 prisoners 
were executed and 15 received longer sentences.  
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be only a temporary marker of memory, which in time should have been replaced with a 
much larger and more artistic memorial complex. However, this temporary 'spontaneous 
shrine', whose role was to ‘commemorate deceased individuals and simultaneously suggest 
an attitude toward a related public issue’ (Santino 2004, p.365), recalling the memory of 
forgotten victims, quickly became an important marker of memory subsequently used by 
'Memorial' to denote lieux de mémoire. However, arguably the Solovetski stones would not 
have become such important memory markers of the Gulag had not one of the boulders 
been placed on Lubyanka Square in Moscow. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The idea to bring a Solovetski stone to Moscow's Lubyanka Square to commemorate the 
victims of political repressions was another spontaneous act. In 1987, when the notion of 
erecting a monument to the victims of Soviet repression first emerged, the form and site 
were by no means fixed8. Even if, from the outset, ‘Memorial’ had wanted to place the 
monument on Lubyanka Square, site of the headquarters and prison of the KGB, and since 
1958, of the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Soviet security service, the fact 
that the monument was a Solovetski stone was an impulsive decision.  
‘Memorial’ had wanted to organize a competition to design the new monument (Smith 
1996, p.153-160). However, this all took time and money, and additional procedural 
problems meant that a ‘temporary memory marker’, was erected instead, to immediately 
start to honour the memory of Soviet victims, and at the same time to mark a memorial 
site where people could meet and remember the dead. Thus, as Mikhail Butorin, who at 
that time worked in the 'Sovest' Association in Archangelsk, recalls, when members of 
'Memorial' in Moscow learned that 'Sovest' intended to erect a Solovetski stone for victims 
of the repression in Arkhangelsk, and that an expedition to the islands was planned for 
that purpose, Moscow 'Memorial' asked 'Sovest' to choose another Solovetski boulder, 
which could be situated at Lubyanka Square and which could facilitate mourning.9  The 
apparently neutral form of the monument was, at the time, its great advantage. A natural 
stone was seen as uncontroversial, and was therefore an ‘ideal’ form for a spontaneous 
shrine. As Santino argues, it demands the personal involvement of visitors, and forces 
them to be active interpreters of the past, rather than bystanders (Santino 2004). 
                                                 
8 Smith, K. E. (1996) Remembering Stalin’s Victims, Popular Memory and the End of the USSR (Ithaca and 
London, Cornell University Press), pp. 153-160 
9 Mikhail Butorin, 'Solovetski kamen' na Lubyanke' Pravda Severa 31.08.2000 
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 The Solovetski stones in Moscow and in Archangelsk were unveiled on 30th October 1990, 
an important date for Russian dissidents. In October 1974, when political prisoners held in 
camps in Mordovia, Perm and Vladimirsk organised a hunger strike, Andrei Sakharov 
announced at a press conference in Moscow that October 30th will be the ‘Day of Political 
Prisoners, the Day of Struggle and Freedom’. In subsequent years, political prisoners held 
in camps organized further hunger strikes and protests (Grabinova 2007) on this date 
because it had no prior association with any other important political or historical event. 
In 1991, 30th October became an official national holiday, but was renamed 'The Day of 
Victims of Political Repressions'.10  
In this way, 'Memorial' as a memory actor, Solovki as a specific historical site and the 
Solovetski stones as a sign of memory are connected. The Solovetski stones started to play 
an important role, not only because they were ‘spontaneous shrines’, around which it was 
possible to collect to grieve and perform memory rituals, but also because they were 
perceived almost as 'witnesses' to specific historical events. These sentiments were clearly 
expressed in the inscription on the plinth of the stone in Lubyanka Square: 'This stone was 
brought by the 'Memorial' Society from the territory of the Solovetski Special Purpose 
Camp, and erected to commemorate the victims of the totalitarian regime'. Thus, the 
Solovetski stones became important material relics of the repressive Soviet past. People 
who have not experienced the repressions and who, sometimes for the first time in their 
lives, heard about the tragedy, could touch a historical relic. This materiality of the 
monument, undoubtedly, had a great impact on the people’s perception of the past at 
that time.  
Being a kind of ‘spontaneous shrine’, the stones quickly became symbols of contestation 
with a state which does not respect its citizens (Iofe 2002, p.113). This meaning was 
already assigned by 1990, when the Solovetski stone was unveiled in Lubyanka Square, and 
was later repeatedly emphasized by members of 'Memorial'. It also became typical of 
'Memorial'’s memory marker. As Irina Flige, then representative of the 'Memorial' Society 
in St. Petersburg, explained in 2006, back in 1990, 'Memorial' had decided to build a 
monument to victims of political repression on Troicky Square in St. Petersburg, and the 
plinth for the future monument was erected, but the monument was unveiled only in 
September 2002. The members of 'Memorial' were fundraising and waiting for an 
                                                 
10 Inna Grabinova writes about this holiday in 30 oktabrya – den’ pamyati i borby, “30 oktabrya”, nr 79, 2007. 
Official recognition of the holiday was embraced by society, however, not all members of ‘Memorial’ are in 
favour of the new name. It is because, as Irina Flige explained at interview, the government has changed the 
original meaning of the holiday. It is no longer a Day of Struggle and Freedom, but a Day of the Victims of the 
Repressions. 
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auspicious moment to bring a Solovetski boulder to St. Petersburg because, as she 
explained:  
It was important to us, where the stone is from. It was important not only that the 
stone was from Solovki, but also from a particular place (…) Sekirnaya Hill11 is a 
symbol of sacrifice. It is like a cemetery [...]. Golgotha Mount12 also has a narrow 
and specific meaning. Savvatievo is the most meaningful place […] These are people 
who died in the political opposition, because from 1923 to 1925 this place was called 
the 'political hermitage’. There the real enemies of Soviet power were imprisoned, 
there the most severe hunger strike against the political regime took place. 
Therefore this memory sign is complex. Thus, the stone is from there.'13 
Today, there are Solovetski stones in Moscow, Archangelsk, St. Petersburg and on Solovki. 
Together they forth a kind of matrix, semantically related one to another as memory 
markers; linked together not only by the provenance of the stones themselves, but also by 
the role they play in the interpretation of the repressions constructed by 'Memorial'. The 
stones bear witness to the Russian authorities' destruction of their own citizens for 
'disloyalty' (Bogumił 2012a, p.78-80). The power of these monuments originates from their 
nature as members of the small group of monuments erected in the late Soviet and early 
post-Soviet periods, which refer to the past, but which do not have the ‘monumental scale 
and messages of the Tsarist and Soviet traditions’ (Forest and Johnson 2002: 541).  Thus, 
they are meaningful enough to support a viable civic tradition (Forest and Johnson 2002: 
541). We concur that when these monuments were erected in the late 1980s/early 1990s 
their meaning was evident; they were honouring the dead and helping society come to 
terms with past repressions14. However, the problem of these spontaneous shrines was 
that as signs of memory they acted only temporarily. Thus, when political attitude in 
Russia towards the Soviet repressions changed, the social impact of the stones has also 
changed. The 'neutral' and universal nature of the stone monuments, which was the initial 
strength of the Solovetski boulders monuments in the early 1990s, became their weakness, 
exactly because each viewer imposes upon these monuments their own interpretation. 
                                                 
11 Sekirnaya Gora, (which translates as 'Pole-axe Hill' from the Russian 'sekir' for pole-axe) is one of the highest 
points on the main island of Solovestky. In the orthodox chapel on the top of the hill, there was detention 
during the period of SLON and its slopes served as a place of execution. 
12 Golgotha Mount (Gora Golgofa) is the highest hill on Anzer Island, the second largest island of the 
Archipelago. In the orthodox chapel on the top of this hill there was a camp hospital, where many prisoners 
died. 
13 For a history of the erection of this monument on Troitsky Square in St Petersburg, see Bogumił (2012b). 
14 See Irina Paperno on the politics of the dead bodies in Irina Paperno, 2001, “Exhuming the Bodies of Soviet 
Terror”, Representations, vol 75, no 1, 89-118. 
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Thus, when another memory actor, the Russian Orthodox Church, began to offer 
alternative, very specific and visually appealing ways of commemorating the Gulag, the 
'Memorial' memory markers arguably began to lose their impact. The Orthodox church 
started to intensively interpret Gulag history at the end of the 1980s, and, in parallel with 
'Memorial', very quickly became interested in commemorating the Gulag past on the 
Solovetski Islands. When in 1990 the Russian Orthodox Church returned to the Solovetski 
Islands, the Bishop of Murmansk and the Arkhangelsk Panteleimon said in an interview for 
Severnaya Pravda that the Church's main objective was to restore both the monastery, and 
Solovki's status as a major religious and pilgrimage centre.15 As Solovetski Special Purpose 
Camp became a place of exile and death for many bishops, clergy, and Orthodox 
believers, camp history started to play an important role in the process of the restoration 
of the Monastery on Solovki. This was clearly expressed by the Archbishop of Lviv and 
Galician Augustine:  
I believe that every Orthodox person necessarily should find the opportunity to 
be on Solovki [...] The Solovetski New Martyrs and Confessors were like the 
early Christians, like those who in Rome and other places of the Roman Empire 
who died because of persecution. Many have accepted martyrdom with 
gratitude, because in such a way they could testify about their faith and love 
for the Lord. During the persecution of the Christians, Rome was like a second 
Golgotha, and the Solovetski Golgotha may be perceived in the history of 
Christianity as a third one. Certainly, for the Orthodox Russians, Solovki is the 
national Golgotha (Osipenko 2007, p.255).  
Even though during the reconstruction of the monastery many relics of the former camp, 
such as bars, barbed wire, or prisoner graffiti were removed, the memory of those who 
perished on Solovki defending the Orthodox faith is preserved and encoded in numerous 
crosses erected on the Archipelago. The importance of these memory signs for the 
Orthodox Church is evidenced by the fact that, during his first to Solovki in 1992, the 
patriarch, Aleksy II blessed the Solovetski Cross,  which was erected in a very symbolic 
site, at the foot of the stairs leading to the top of Sekirnaya Hill, where a powerful Gulag 
legend maintains that prisoners were killed by being thrown down these stairs. As the 
sculptor explained at interview in 2007:  
The idea of this cross appeared when I learned how to make crosses. I 
measured the crosses on the Solovki, and especially on Anzer Island, [...]. 
                                                 
15 A. Mozgovoy 'Verite v vozrozhdenie' Pravda Severa 20.10.1990 
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According to existing description there was a 9-metre high cross [...]. We 
searched for it [...]. We found that cross in a very poor condition. It had fallen 
down and was overgrown [...]. Some pieces of wood could be seen. And there 
was the writing 'Tsar Glory, Jesus Christ'[...]. It was the old alphabet, the old 
technique. [...] I was shocked that the Church was so dishonoured, forgotten, 
forsaken [...]. I wanted to make a copy of this cross and to put it somewhere so 
that it lives a new life. When we heard what happened here [at Sekirnaya Hill] 
with us and our relatives, we had to fix it. I suggested [...], to the governor of 
the monastery that I could make a cross, and that we put it in a place where 
people were killed. At the bottom, where they actually met their end.  
Thus, a replica of the Anzer cross was erected at the foot of the steps leading to Sekirnaya 
Hill (Figure 2). The size of the cross on Anzer Island, and its location at one of the island's 
highest points ensured that it served as a significant sign for the residents of the 
archipelago. While blessing its replica at the foot of Sekirnaya Hill, Aleksy II stressed that 
the lives of the so-called 'New Holy Martyrs' (Bogumił 2010b, 2011) should serve as an 
example for future generations. The Solovetski cross was intended to show believers the 
direction of their further spiritual development, just as its prototype on Anzer indicated a 
way home to the fishermen at sea.16  
[Figure 2 about here] 
In this way the tradition of Solovetski crosses, of which there were many standing on the 
archipelago before the Revolution17, was renewed by the Russian Orthodox Church, and 
the crosses themselves quickly became important signs of memory articulating the Russian 
Orthodox 'New Martyrdom' narrative (Bogumił 2010a&b, 2011). Since the beginning of the 
21st century, Solovetski crosses have followed Solovetski stones in leaving the Islands in 
order to mark significant sites of memory for the Russian Orthodox Church. The first cross 
was erected in front of the Solovetski Monastery in Moscow, denoting a place where 
people can come and pray for relatives deceased in Solovki or at other Gulag sites. 18 
Another, the biggest Solovetski cross, was erected in front of the church of the New 
Russian Martyrs and Confessors at the Butovo mass graves near Moscow, to mark one of the 
                                                 
16 For the history and meaning of other Solovetski crosses located on the Archipelago and dedicated to the 
victims of repressions see Bogumił (2012b). 
17 Up to the closure of the monastery in 1920 on the Solovetski Islands, there were about three thousand 
crosses. N. Kopylova, V pamyat' o novomuchenikakh i ispovednikakh Solovetskikh, Moskovskii zhurnal, 4, 
04.2001. 
18 Pravoslavnyi tserkovnyi kalendar' 2002, p.166 
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most significant sites of Soviet repression and raises the importance of this new sacred 
place. (Figure 3). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Butovo – lieux de mémoire of New Russian Martyrs 
Butovo's status as an important symbol of Soviet repression reflects the fact that from the 
mid-1930s to the early 195Os it was the site of the greatest number of mass shootings near 
to Moscow (Shancev 2007). During the Great Terror 20,761 people were executed there 
(Shancev 2007, p.144). The first monument to denote a lieux de mémoire was erected here 
by 'Memorial', in the form of a gravestone, placed next to the public road running beside 
the mass graves (Figure 4). However, since the mid-1990s, when control of Butovo was 
handed over to the Orthodox Church, the site has steadily taken on the appearance of an 
Orthodox site of memory. The territory of the mass graves was first fenced off, like a 
conventional Russian cemetery, and the main entrance to the enclosed area was moved 
away from the main road, so that visitors now entered from a perpendicular road. As a 
result the 'Memorial' monument was now at the periphery of the cemetery, marginalising 
both the monument, and its impact on visitors. A new Orthodox chapel was built just 
beyond the new entrance, and the mass graves were marked with mounds, and with some 
single Orthodox crosses. The names of the victims were inscribed on a plaque at the end 
of the cemetery. On the other side of the public road a large Orthodox Church dedicated 
to the New Russian Martyrs and Confessors was built, next to which, in 2007, (the 70th 
anniversary of the Great Terror), a large Solovetski cross was erected. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The transportation of this cross from Solovki to Butovo, and its erection next to the 
Orthodox Church carried a very symbolic meaning in terms of the use of this site to further 
a particular interpretation of Gulag history and commemoration of the 'New Russian 
Martyrs'. As the exhibition 19  prepared for the occasion by the Solovetski monastery 
informed visitors: 
Butovo and Solovki are associated not only by enormity of the evil that took 
place there; these places are invisibly bound together by the fate of the New 
Russian Martyrs. Many SLON prisoners, who miraculously survived the camp 
                                                 
19 From the text of the exhibition 'Krestnyi Put' - Solovki - Butovo' displayed at the Solovetski Monastery, 
August 2007. 
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tortures were again arrested in 1937-1938. They sacrificed their lives to God on 
Butovsky training ground. A similar fate was experienced by many other 
prisoners of the Gulag... 
To recall the past, the cross travelled to Moscow in a religious 'procession', the so-called 
Krestnyi khod. Initially, it was transported by sea, and later via the Belomor Canal and the 
Moscow River. The cross's journey was effectively a pilgrimage recalling the ‘Stations of 
the Cross’ the stages of the crucifixion of Christ. It stopped for prayer at significant Gulag 
history sites such as former lagernyi punkt [transitional camps], the Sandarmokh cemetery, 
burial place of the victims of the mass political repressions in Karelia,20 sites 'where new 
Russian martyrs and confessors have fulfilled their dedication, defended the Faith and 
Truth, in the former camps and places marked with the blood and tears of murdered 
innocents'21.  
The Krestnyi khod was broadcast by major TV stations and was the most high profile media 
event of the 70th anniversary of the Great Terror. The pilgrimage expressed sorrow for 
past 'sins', and its role was to purify the nation from the mistakes of the past. It was 
dedicated to the zeks [zaklyuchennii, camp prisoners] who had built with their own hands 
the canals along which the cross travelled, and the lagernye punkty where there were 
breaks for prayers. The krestnyi khod can be perceived as a kind of anti-behaviour (with the 
meaning given to that term by Boris Uspensky). Its goal was to purify the nation by 
application of reversed meanings. Instead of by land, the Cross travelled by water; 
upstream not down. Krestnyi khod not only linked the two 'Russian Golgothas', Solovki and 
Butovo, but also gave shape to the subsequent Russian Orthodox memorialisation of the 
Gulag (Bogumił 2012b). This idea was fully expressed in the symbolism of the Solovetski 
cross set in Butovo. As the sculptor of the cross explained at interview: 
For the first time we made a cross consisting of three different types of wood 
[...]. Like the cross of Christ [...]. Moreover, the cross in Butovo has two sides. 
The front symbolises the victory of the Orthodox Church, the Holy Church, with 
the angels, the Archangel [...] these are unearthly objects. On the back there 
is the earthly Church, the Church which struggles with sin. I presented there 
crosses which symbolise that Butovo is a cemetery [...] that is why the back has 
the crosses. I presented there the Crown of Thorns [...] And there is another 
                                                 
20 Catherine Merridale writes about Sandarmokh and the first memory days which took place there in October 
1997 in Night of Stone, Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia, Viking, New York 2001, pp. 1-20. 
21 Quotation from the exhibition text. 
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element - the thorns are interspersed with barbed wire. This was the 
instrument of murder of the New Russian Martyrs and Confessors of the 20th 
century. On the front of the cross [...] in the centre, is the Crown of Christ. 
This is his crown. I filled it with New Martyrs. This is their participation in the 
victory. 
A year after the erection of the Solovetski cross at Butovo, a corresponding cross was 
erected on the road leading to the mass graves at the top of Sekirnaya Hill on the 
Solovetski Islands. The front of this cross carries the same symbolism as the back of the 
Butovo cross. In this way, the two Solovetski crosses, one at Butovo and one on Sekirnaya 
Hill, form a kind of axis connecting the two 'Russian Golgothas'. This connection is made 
not only on the basis of the historical significance of both places (as mass graves for mass 
shootings) but on the basis of the symbolism of crosses which facilitates dialogue between 
these two places. The inscriptions on the cross on Sekirnaya Hill indicate the both 
repression that took place on Solovki in general, and on that site, the most deadly place of 
the archipelago, in particular. The placement of the same inscriptions on the reverse side 
of the cross in Butovo seems to explain that the system developed at Solovki spread all 
over the country, culminating in the Great Terror, of which Butovo is a site-symbol. But 
the repressions which took place in the earthly world, are overshadowed by the symbolism 
of the front of the cross. In this way the cross at Butovo commemorates the repression, 
but above all is witness to Christ's victory over death and evil; a victory in which the new 
Russian martyrs participate. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the importance of Butovo and Solovetski Islands in 
the history of new Russian martyrdom is also expressed in the official icon of the New 
Russian Martyrs and Confessors (Khala 2010). On both sides of the icon there are smaller 
icons which represent scenes of individual martyrdom (right side) and scenes of mass 
martyrdom (left side). The Solovetski Islands are located at the top while Butovo closes 
the scenes of mass martyrdom. Both places are thus linked not only geographically 
(through the crosses erected on mass graves in Sekirnaya Hill on Solovetski Islands and 
Butovo), but also mystically, in the icon, of which the original is in the Cathedral of Christ 
the Saviour in Moscow, with copies in many local Orthodox churches so that every 
Orthodox believer could pray to God through the intercession of the new martyrs. Amongst 
the new martyrs commemorated in the icon is Tsar Nicholas II, murdered in Ekaterinburg.  
Ekaterinburg – lieux de mémoire of the Russian Royal Family or ‘Gateway to the Gulag’? 
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The Tsar's assassination in July 1918 in the basement of the Ipatiev House is widely 
perceived in Russian society as the beginning of Russia's 'suffering' of the 20th century. The 
impact of the execution of the last Russian Emperor on the nation’s history was clearly 
expressed by one interviewee, a resident of Kolyma engaged in erecting Orthodox crosses 
on the territory of the former Sevvostlag camp cemeteries, at interview in 2008: 
In March 1917, when the Tsar abdicated, they celebrated a great victory. But, 
three years passed and in March 1921, half of those who celebrated they were 
no longer living, and the half that still survived, were without wealth, without 
a country [...]. As stated in the Bible, four generations will bear responsibility 
for the sins of their ancestors. The next generation was the one developing 
Kolyma and all the other places far away [...]. It is evidence of what? That 
Russia should repent for the murder of the Tsar and the royal family. 
The Tsar's assassination in Ekaterinburg ensured that this city has become an important 
lieux de mémoire. In the early 1990s, as in other parts of the country, local Ekaterinburg 
newspapers started to discuss the construction of monuments which would commemorate 
the victims of Soviet repressions. The erection of three different monuments was 
envisaged. First was the Khram na Krovi (Church on the Spilled Blood), which was planned 
to be built at the location of the murder of the Tsar and his family. Second was a 
memorial to the victims of political repressions located at the so-called ‘12km down the 
Moscow road’ site where between 30 and 50 mass executions of more than twenty 
thousand people took place. The last monument was 'Mask Europe-Asia' designed by 
sculptor Ernst Neizvetsnii, 22  which was planned to be built on the border between 
European Russia and Siberia as a kind of ‘Gateway to the Gulag’. This monument was part 
of a wider memory complex, a triptych named 'The Russian Triangle of Suffering and 
Redemption', consisting of three Masks standing at significant sites of the history of the 
Soviet repressions, in Ekaterinburg, Vorkuta and Magadan. Of the three monuments 
planned in Ekaterinburg, only the first two, Khram na Krovi and the Memorial Complex to 
Victims of Political Repressions at ‘12km down the Moscow road’ were built. Despite the 
efforts of the Ekaterinburg ‘Memorial’, Neizvestnii’s Masks monument was not erected, 
due to the strong opposition of the Orthodox Church.  
The idea behind 'The Russian Triangle of Suffering and Redemption', resulted from 
Neizvestnii's participation in a conference organized by Moscow State University in 1989, 
                                                 
22 Anna Pastuchova, 'Ne vremya stroit obeliski, no lyudi', Vechernii Ekaterinburg 30.6.1995; J. Kutozov, 'Kogda 
govarit' tishina' Vechernii Ekaterinburg 29.10.1996 
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where he delivered a lecture on Art and Society.23 The lecture made a great impression on 
the audience, and representatives of various cities asked Neizvestnii to build monuments 
in their towns. The sculptor, chose only three cities. Ekaterinburg, place of execution of 
Tsar Nicholas II; and Vorkuta and Magadan, two of the most notorious Gulag sites in the 
USSR, and decided to link them via these monuments, which due to their symbolism would 
be in constant dialogue and thus contribute to the transformation of Soviet society. The 
meaning of this triptych stimulated the local ‘Memorial’ representatives of Vorkuta, 
Magadan and Ekaterinburg, intensively engaged in their construction, perceived these 
monuments to be an appropriate means to effect societal change. 
All three monuments took the form of masks. The Vorkuta Mask resembled an island 
located on the river bank. Mask was looked across the river towards the site where the 
first coal mine and special purpose camp Rudnik were located (Figure 5). The Mask of 
Sorrows in Magadan was intended to gaze sadly towards the Kolyma gates, where ships had 
docked to allow prisoners to disembark (Figure 6). In Ekaterinburg, two masks were 
planned, with European and Asian-featured faces gazing in opposite directions (Figure 7). 
The rear 'interiors' of the masks were to be in opposition to their calm exteriors; filled 
with crosses engulfed by eternal fire, which were 'embracing the European victims and 
Asian victims and in such a way presenting the scale of our tragedy and our pain'.24 In a 
newspaper article stored in the 'Memorial' archive in Ekaterinburg, the director of the 
Ekaterinburg Artists Association explained the symbolism of this monument in the 
following way,  
These masks literally came to us from antiquity. We all are the victims of a 
thoughtless idea [...]. The monument should reflect eternal mourning for 
people innocently killed, and should change us like a panikhida 25  in the 
Orthodox church, like Bach music, like a Greek tragedy.26 
[Figures 5, 6 and 7 about here] 
According to the agreement between 'Memorial', the city authorities and Ernst Neizvestnii, 
the Mask monument should have been unveiled during the City Day in 1991.27 However, by 
                                                 
23 A. Leoig ‘Treugol'nik stradanii Ernsta Neizvestnogo Magadan, Vorkuta, Ekaterinburg, v Kolyma. Dal’stroi. 
Gulag. Skorb' i sud’by, Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii M. Biryukov  Severnii Mezhdunarodnii 
Universitet Magadan 1998, pp. 67-71 
24 Ia. Andreyev 'Litsom k litsu' Ural’skii Rabochii  09.1990 
25 A memorial service 
26 Ilya Gintsei 'Komu on nuzhen, etot pamyatnik?' Unsourced article. 
27 'Memorial' Archive, Ekaterinburg. Agreement Number 156. 
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1993 the monument had still not been erected. From the outset there were problems with 
funding for the construction of the monument, but it was the protest by the Russian 
Orthodox Bishop of Ekaterinburg and Kurgan, Melkhisedek, against the monument, which 
had the greatest impact. In his letter to the city authorities, the bishop claimed that the 
spiritual dimension of the monument was very problematic. Monuments commemorating 
the dead, he argued, are the most important cultural phenomena because they embody 
the spiritual and cultural traditions of the nation. Thus, these monuments must express 
the nation's spirit and not just the artist's vision. The bishop asked whose cultural traditions 
were being expressed in Ernst Neizvestnii's Ekaterinburg monument, and argued that the 
monument offended various religious feelings, not only those of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. He was convinced that the only appropriate sign of memory was an Orthodox 
church, chapel or cross', particularly in a place such as Ekaterinburg, where Tsar Nicholas 
II and his family were killed.28  
The bishop's arguments were picked up by representatives and members of different 
organisations who also joined the protest, discussed in detail in the local press in 1993.29 A 
member of the Ekaterinburg City Council claimed that the masks were empty signs, and 
that the only adequate way to commemorate the victims of repressions was through the 
Khram na Krovi. The representative of the Organisation of the Victims of Political 
Repressions in Ekaterinburg argued that the proposed location of the Mask monument was 
also problematic, because the nearby Palace of Youth (Dvorets Molodezhi) was a site which 
'emanates optimism and hope for the future'. Moreover, there was already a monument 12 
kilometres down the Moscow road, so why was another necessary, especially one so 
expensive? Another added that the monument was too generic - it could be erected 
anywhere in the world 'in Taiwan, Indonesia or Germany' but not in Russia. The size of the 
monument also provoked doubts. An art expert claimed that the monument was huge and 
reflected the nation's obsession with gigantism. Others also argued that the money for the 
monument should be given to people who needed it and not spent on this 'gigantic 
monster' of 'Neizvestnii (the unknown) Michaelangelo'.30  
Supporters of the Mask monument questioned why the Orthodox Church should be 
concerned about the spiritual representation of the Mask monument at all, when many 
                                                 
28 Melkhisedek, 'Narodnom nas delat' pamyat'' Glagol March 1993 
29 'Dialogi u monumenta' Glagol March 1993 
30 Pineava, M 'Pora trogat' Glagol March 1993 Boris Iakov 'Maski my vas ne znayem' Oblastnaya 
Malod'ozhnaya Gazeta 1993 
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memorials of the Great Patriotic War had no religious meaning. 31  A journalist from 
Vechernii Ekaterinburg, even questioned the basis of the bishop's rights to talk about the 
religious feelings of people of other faiths. And why should Khram na Krovi, which reflected 
the values of only one religious group, be better than the Mask monument which would 
reflect the ideas of different groups? Why could both monuments not be erected? 32 
Another supporter claimed that the city authorities should provide the money for the Mask 
monument because 'the authorities conducted the terror in 1930s, so it is the authorities 
which should erect the monument of sorrows'. 33  However, the protest of the Russian 
Orthodox community prevailed, and the 'Mask Europe-Asia' monument was not erected.  
Magadan  - lieux de mémoire of Soviet utopian consciousness or another site of new martyrs? 
In Magadan, the fate of Ernst Neizvestnii's Mask of Sorrows was rather different. As one 
employee of the Magadan Cultural Centre explained at interview in 2008:  
For years in the city there were only so-called ‘on duty’ monuments: statues of 
Lenin and representations of the Communist Party. No other monuments were 
built, because nobody wanted to stay all his life in Magadan. In general, people 
wanted to live here for some time, earn some money and then move to the 
central parts of USSR. Therefore, they did not pay attention to monuments as 
determinants of cultural identity. 
However, at the end of the 1980s, the situation changed, with people growing attached to 
this region, and choosing to stay; some because they had an emotional attachment to 
place, others because they could not envisage living anywhere else. As one of the 
residents of the town of Debin claimed in 2008: 'we are voluntary zeks, we cannot leave 
this place, we cannot even go to Magadan, we have no money'. Therefore, discussions 
about a memorial of the victims of the Gulag in Magadan developed in conjunction with 
debates about other monuments to be erected in the city (Bogumił 2012b, pp. 279-282). 
The idea was to create a network of monuments which expressed the identity of the 
inhabitants of Kolyma. The proposed 'Mask of Sorrows', however, provoked the most 
heated discussions.  
The sculptor claimed that the 'Mask of Sorrows' is a death mask reflecting the character of 
its era. Since the left side of the brain is responsible for memory, there are masks on the 
                                                 
31 Boris Iakov 'Maski my vas ne znayem' Oblastnaya Malod'ozhnaya Gazeta 1993 
32 Ia. Andreyev 'I Khram i pamyatnik - nashe obshche pokayanie' Vechernii Ekaterinburg 13.02.1993 
33 Iu. Matafonova 'Srazhenie - ne vozrazhenie' Ural’skii Rabochii 9.02.1993 
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left side of the face which imitate human tears. Masks also symbolize the community of 
prisoners, reflecting their different ages, nationalities, characters and attitudes towards 
the reality which surrounded them, as well as their different ways of experiencing pain.34 
On the back of the mask is a cross with a figure of a man; however, the crucified man 
does not accept the cross, instead he is pictured breaking away from it, therefore this 
representation is not a symbol of victimhood or reconciliation, but rather a symbol of 
anger and refusal to accept a fate of slavery.35 It is this allegedly profane use of Christian 
symbolism that caused a storm around Ernst Neizvestnii's monument, and for which he was 
strongly criticized.  
It was argued that the 'Mask of Sorrows' was blasphemous, and that it offended the 
religious feelings of Russian Orthodox believers.36 Vechernii Magadan quoted the argument 
of the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Theology of the Russian Orthodox University 
in Moscow, one of the opponents of the monument, who stated that in the Christian 
culture a body stretched on the cross is associated with Christ; who accepts its suffering. 
But Neizvestnii's Mask sculpture symbolised not sacrifice or reconciliation, but revolt; the 
crucified man resembled Prometheus rather than Christ. The monument to victims of 
Bolshevism was thus imbued with the idea of Bolshevism itself 37  and reflected the 
apotheosis of hate. The man with outstretched arms seemed ready to kill anyone who 
used force to enslave him.38  
The allegation of the profane use of Christian symbolism in the Mask monument provoked 
the Russian Orthodox community in Magadan to start a petition of opponents of the 
monument, in an attempt to convince the city authorities to halt its construction. Their 
main argument was that the Mask monument did not correspond to the Russian Orthodox 
faith, and that it therefore contradicted the spirit of the Russian nation.39 Their petition 
also included a letter from the Bishop of Ekaterinburg, which in turn contained a detailed 
explanation of the whole controversy. It was once again stressed that since the Mask 
memorialised the dead, it should be in line with the cultural traditions of the nation, and 
should form an integral part of national identity formation. Ernst Neizvestnii's Mask of 
                                                 
34 D. Raizman 'Detal Monumenta' Kolymskii Trakt 14.07.1999 
35 D. Raizman 'Detal Monumenta' Kolymskii Trakt 14.07.1999 
36 'Krest bez Khrista' Vechernii Magadan 12.01.1996 quoting Pravoslavnaya Moskva no.29, 1995 
37 'Krest bez Khrista' Vechernii Magadan 12.01.1996 quoting Pravoslavnaya Moskva no.29, 1995 
38 D. Raizman 'Detal Monumenta' Kolymskii Trakt 14.07.1999 
39 'Nerastorzhimaya chast' narodnogo dukh'' Vechernii Magadan 30.04.1993  
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Sorrows, they argued, did not express the values of the nation, so future generations 
would learn nothing about the Russian nation from looking at this monument.40  
The aesthetics of the monument were also criticized. 41 The protests from the Russian 
Orthodox Church emphasized that the memorial should produce positive feelings in the 
viewer, and express deeper meanings, but that the Mask of Sorrows was instead hiding the 
truth; that it suggested hypocrisy, deceit, two-facedness,42 and was therefore unsuitable 
for this kind of memorialisation. The Mask, they argued, was nothing more than a violation 
of a thousand years of Orthodox Christianity and Russian tradition.43  
The Russian Orthodox Church asked who the monument was for - the living, or the dead? If 
for the dead, it argued that people sentenced to imprisonment in Magadan were members 
of 'traditional culture', claiming therefore that they were mostly brought up 'in the 
Orthodox faith', and that the monument should therefore empathize with their situation 
and consider whether they would like be buried under "Ernst's cross" or whether they 
'would rather prefer to lie in the open air'.44 If the monument was for the living, then it 
was deemed useless, because they argued that respect to the dead could only be learned 
through education, and not through this monument. Just as in Ekaterinburg, the Mask's 
opponents again claimed that the only appropriate monument was the Russian Orthodox 
chapel, or the cross, and that such a symbol should be erected, rather than the Mask.45  
The Mask of Sorrows' supporters explained that the cross in the Mask had nothing to do 
with Christianity; that it was simply a tool of torture.46 Their explanation emphasized that 
not all secular art must necessarily move away from God; that secular art may carry a 
deeper Biblical message. For them the significance of the monument lay in the contrast - 
the gap between the dispassionate and indifferent gaze of the Mask, and the utter tragedy 
conveyed by the whole composition.47 This aesthetic was very significant; the Mask was 
not only a memorial to the victims; but its form and its message also demonstrated the 
intellectual and moral mediocrity of those who developed the Gulag.48 It was emphasized 
that the monument was not an idol, but a symbol, which expressed memory, and that 
people should honour this symbol. Moreover, it was also a symbol of faith in the 
                                                 
40 'Nerastorzhimaya chast' narodnogo dukh'' Vechernii Magadan 30.04.1993 
41 'Nerastorzhimaya chast' narodnogo dukh'' Vechernii Magadan 30.04.1993 
42 ''Maska' vzglyad c dukhovnoi strany' Vechernii Magadan 10.02.1995 
43 'Scenarii pod nazvaniyem 'Monument'' Vechernii Magadan 24.03.1995 
44 'Krest bez Khrista' Vechernii Magadan 12.01.1996 quoting Pravoslavnaya Moskva no.29, 1995 
45 'Komu vse eto nuzhno?' Vechernii Magadan 23.04.1993 
46 'Komu vse eto nuzhno?' Vechernii Magadan 23.04.1993 
47 Ia. Szalirnov 'Ne Kaluzhskii eto-kriesti' Vechernii Magadan 21.06.1996 
48 I. Medovoy 'Chtob ne vidit ni trusa ni shipkoy gryaz' Kultura 15.06.1996 
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democratic future of Russia49 with the monument itself commemorating victims of other 
totalitarian states which adopted Marxist ideology. 50 Ernst Neizvestny wrote about the 
message of the monuments as follows:  
I see what happened in the Soviet Union as an anthropological crime against 
humankind in general, it's not the tragedy of an individual social group, this is 
not the tragedy of an individual nation, not even the tragedy of Russia, but it is 
like a disaster in Germany, like fascism.51  
The Mask was therefore a sign of an inclination towards ‘utopian consciousness’ which may 
lead to a disaster comparable to those that took place the 20th century. Despite the 
vehement criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Mask of Sorrows was unveiled in 
Magadan during commemorations of the Day of Victims of Political Repressions, organized 
specially for this occasion, in June 1996. As Miron Etlis, the representative of ‘Memorial’ in 
Magadan stressed at interview in 2008: ‘how did we managed to do it [unveil the 
monument] during the Yeltsin era? It is a secret of political manoeuvring’. But also of the 
specificity of the Kolyma region; the debate about monuments in Magadan’s newspapers 
at the beginning of 1990’s had a great impact on Kolyma inhabitants, and meant that the 
Mask became an important marker of local identity. 
Pre-eminence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 21st century  
By the beginning of the 21st century, the status of Gulag memory in Kolyma, as in all of 
Russia, had changed (Bogumił 2012a). The economic crisis and political changes of the 
mid-late 1990s arguably derailed the process of cultural change, and the 1997 Law 'On 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association' strengthened the Russian Orthodox 
Church's position in society, and its impact on the shape of collective memory of the 
Gulag. In consequence, crosses or memory chapels are today erected not only by 
representatives of the Russian Orthodox church, but also increasingly often by some 
'Memorial' members. Even if members of St Petersburg or Moscow ‘Memorial’ are opposed 
to confessional signs of memory, claiming that they impose a particular understanding of 
the past, members of other ‘Memorial’ branches state that these are universal symbols, 
which express their meaning unambiguously. As a representative of 'Youth Memorial', who 
                                                 
49 D. Raizman 'Detal Monumenta' Kolymskii Trakt 14.07.1999 
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Gulag. Skorb’ i sud’by. Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii' M. Biryukov  Severnii Mezhdunarodnii 
Universitet Magadan 1998, p67 
51 E. Neizvestnii'Ya vsyudu odin i tot zhe' Druzhba Narodov no. 12, 1989, p70 
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organises river rafting tours on the 'memory rivers' in Perm' region, and who erects 
memorials to Gulag victims, claimed at interview in 2008 
I do not really like the confessional character of memorials. In the 1930s and 
1940s many people in the Soviet Union were atheists, and yet to commemorate 
them I erect the cross [...]. But the cross, as is shown in our European 
tradition, not only the Russian tradition, indicates that a place is a memorial 
[...] it catches the attention and indicates that the place honours the memory 
of a person. So, I usually erect crosses. The Catholic one as well [as the 
Orthodox].  
The best example of this 'turn' towards religious representation, in which Russian Orthodox 
symbolism has become the dominant visual language of remembrance of the Gulag, is 
perhaps the monument to the Victims of Political Repressions erected by the Pokayanie 
Foundation in Syktyvkar, in the Komi Republic (Figure 8). Pokayanie was founded by the 
members of Syktyvkar 'Memorial' Society, and is the only non-government organisation 
which both has its roots in the 'Memorial' movement and is supported from the Republic's 
budget. The Republic authorities gave special funds for the erection of the monument, 
unveiled in 2001 in one of the city's squares. Rather than an 'artistic vision' like the Mask 
monument, it takes the shape of an Orthodox chapel. The metal relief on the central back 
wall, which represents the 'night arrest' of a Gulag victim, reemphasises the intertwining 
of Christian iconography within Gulag memorialisation; the relief depicts a man who was a 
dedicated Communist, signified by the hammer and sickle badge held by a child in its 
outstretched hand. The man was evidently rewarded by the authorities who also caused 
his death. The whole scene recalls Christ's Crucifixion, with women standing next to the 
cross, Mary his mother and Magdalena; here his wife. The man himself seems to accept his 
fate humbly and his gaze, directed at the hammer and sickle, reflects contrition and 
remorse for his sins. In contrast to Mask of Sorrow in Magadan, the way the Syktyvkar 
monument uses the religious representations does not seem to violate the Orthodox faith 
and the monument was willingly consecrated by an Orthodox priest. Mikhail Rogachov, a 
representative of the Pokayanie Foundation, explained why they chose this form for the 
monument: ‘The idea was to point out that the history of the Gulag took place on 
Orthodox soil’. He stressed, however, that the chapel commemorates all the dead, not 
just Orthodox believers. He also pointed out that on 30th October, priests of different 
confessions come to the Chapel to celebrate the Day of Victims of Political Repressions, 
and others of different faiths pray outside. Rogachov believes that the chapel is a '’shared' 
marker of memory. However, the question still arises over whether this cooperation will 
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be harmonious. Will the Syktyvkar chapel remain a shared sign of memory when the Gulag 
becomes part of the cultural memory, and its only material relics are stones and Orthodox 
crosses and chapels? Will today’s broad understanding of the meaning of this memory sign, 
always remain inclusive? The examples of Ekaterinburg and Magadan call 'unifying' nature 
of these religious markers into question. Is it really possible that a site imbued with the 
religious iconography of one group can became a common lieux de memoire? 
[Figure 8 about here] 
Discussion: Sacred or Secular 
As the post-Soviet period has progressed, the Russian people have confronted the various 
aspects of the legacy of the Soviet period in general, and of the repressions in particular. 
Despite the passage of time, public attitudes toward Stalin and the mass repressions 
remain deeply contradictory, with a kaleidoscope of opinions ranging from the 'harmless' 
nostalgia for the sense of predictability and security of the Soviet era, via a complex 
relationship between Soviet nostalgia and Russian nationalism, to the more controversial 
'rehabilitation' of Stalin as a national hero and the marginalisation of the Stalinist 
repressions as part of the retelling of Soviet history in what is arguably a new era of 
political repression (Khrushcheva 2005; Oushakine 2007; Nikolayenko 2008). Shlapentokh 
and Bondartseva (2009, p.302) argue that this ongoing crystallisation of attitude is a 
powerful indicator that at the beginning of the 21st century, Russia still 'does not have an 
ideology that can unite the majority of the elite and the masses'. In this foment of 
opinion, the memorialisation of the repressions, through lieux de mémoire, provides a 
tangible example of these debates being played out both via public debate in the press, 
and in the cultural landscape, in ways which are intended to influence collective memory 
and inform opinion and interpretation of the significance of the repressions; opinion which 
in turn has the potential to shape contemporary social and political developments in the 
Russian Federation. 
Dorman (2010) argues that the rising number of New Russian Martyr canonizations has 
accompanied 'a progressive and discreet transfer of responsibility for commemorative 
affairs from the state to the Orthodox Church', resulting in the dominance of a particular 
kind of memory of the repressions, that identifies and reifies, amongst millions of victims, 
those who died for their Orthodox faith. At sites such as Butovo, she argues, the New 
Martyrs are overrepresented, and religious commemoration dominates any secular 
remembrance. Our own study of the Butovo site demonstrates the specific ways in which 
secular commemoration has been marginalised not only through the rearrangement of the 
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site (which minimised the impact of the 'Memorial' stone), but also in the discourses which 
surrounded the Orthodox memorial, in which the thousands of Butovo victims are 
subsumed within the narrative of the 'New Martyrs'. Although at Butovo around one 
thousand victims were certainly murdered for their religious beliefs, these killings 
represent a fraction of the total number of deaths, which stands at over twenty thousand. 
Elsewhere, our evidence from Ekaterinburg and Magadan demonstrates that at these sites, 
the Russian Orthodox Church actively led opposition to secular commemoration of the 
repression, stating very clearly that commemoration of the dead had to reflect the 
'cultural traditions of the nation', insisting that these cultural traditions were coterminous 
with the values of the Orthodox Church, and that this relationship was essential to ensure 
the appropriate development of national identity, a process to take place through the 
shaping of collective memory at these lieux de mémoire. In Magadan, the Russian Orthodox 
Church explicitly appropriated all Gulag victims as 'believers', claiming that since they 
were of 'traditional culture', they had been brought up 'in the Orthodox faith' - a narrative 
which is one small step away from describing all of Magadan's victims of repression as 
martyrs for the Orthodox faith.  
As the Russian Orthodox Church's 'appropriation' of the memory of the repression gathers 
speed, in the absence of any other coordinated form of memorialisation, alternative forms 
of commemoration at lieux de mémoire are increasingly marginalised, or eliminated 
altogether, as secular organisations adopt the dominant visual lexicon of remembrance. 
The form of the new monument in Syktyvkar suggests that the turn towards recognisably 
Orthodox markers of memory, and towards an Orthodox interpretation of history, along 
with the terminology of the ‘New Russian Martyrs’, has become increasingly evident in 
Russia. Although at the end of the Soviet and beginning of the post-Soviet periods, 
members of 'Memorial' sought to articulate a secular, commemorative lexicon, via the 
erection of non-religious memorials at significant lieux de mémoire, they have not managed 
to create a coherent commemorative language. This is because, as Russian scholar 
Alexander Etkind (2004, pp. 51-52) noted, there was at that time 'no serious philosophical 
debate in Russia, either secular, or religious, which would focus upon the problem of guilt, 
memory and identity of a society that had gone through mass terror'. Elsewhere, such 
debates, such as that of Holocaust memory, involved the participation of philosophers, 
artists, writers and witnesses to the events, and led to the construction of the material 
texture of memory.  In consequence, even if 'Memorial' wanted to make Gulag memory a 
means to transform society, the memories of the repressions have a different shape and 
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function in Russia than Holocaust memory has in the West (Bogumił 2012b; Johnson and 
Forest 2002, pp. 539-543). 
There is also problem of the monuments erected by 'Memorial'. The Society mostly erected 
monuments in the form of Solovetski stone or tombstones, which ‘do not visually 
represent the struggle of prisoners, the uprisings in the camps, hearings and tortures, 
violence and opposition, the hardships, ideology and other matters specific for this 
situation. Crosses and tombstones could commemorate death, but not necessarily this 
particular one that has become the result of a criminal regime. Therefore, these 
monuments 'do not blame, do not protest and do not explain the past’ (Etkind 2004, pp.68 
& 70). In other words, memory projects created by 'Memorial' are not the key to finding an 
answer to the essential questions: how was this possible? How do we move on from this? 
Hence, a return to traditional, recognizable markers of memory is widely visible in Russia. 
The Orthodox perception of the past guarantees a sense of continuation with the past, is 
rooted in the national culture and therefore is easy to understand by majority of society. 
That is why today, even some representatives of 'Memorial’ choose Orthodox iconography 
to mark sites of memory.52 Thus, whether intentionally or not, they lend weight to the 
Orthodox interpretation of Gulag history in terms of its influence on collective memory, 
and, through facilitation of the sedimentation of this interpretation in the visible cultural 
landscape, enable the continued semantic connection between commemoration of victims 
of the repression with the Russian Orthodox narrative of the 'New Russian Martyrs'. This 
`turn' towards Orthodox signs of memory is a slow, but pervasive process, which arguably 
has a significant impact both on the collective memory of the Gulag in Russia, as it 
becomes ever more deeply rooted in Russian Orthodox retellings of history, and in 
contemporary 'rehabilitation' of the Soviet and Stalin period.  
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